Social prosperity for the future: A proposal for Universal Basic Services by Portes, J et al.
an IGP Knowledge Network
Social prosperity for the future: 
A proposal for Universal Basic Services
SOCIAL PROSPERITY
NETWORKREPORT
Healthcare
Education
Democracy + 
Legal Services
Shelter
Food
Transport
Information
© Institute for Global Prosperity (IGP) 2017
University College London (UCL)
Creative Commons Copyright by-nc-sa
Produced by the Social Prosperity Network at the IGP
in association with
Professor Jonathan Portes, Kings College, London
and
Howard Reed, Landman Economics 
and
Andrew Percy, Co-Director of the SPN
SOCIAL PROSPERITY
NETWORKREPORT
The Social Prosperity Network at the IGP at UCL is pleased to present this 
Introduction to Universal Basic Services. 
We welcome your feedback and your contributions. Thank you.
igpspn.org - ubsnow.org
The Current Situation 
in the UK
 
Technical analysis I: into 
Transport and Information
By Howard Reed
Technical analysis II: Into 
Shelter Food, and a basic 
income supplement
By Howard Reed & Andrew Percy
Foreword
By Professor Henrietta L. Moore
 
Universal Basic Services: 
A larger life for the ordinary 
person 
By Andrew Percy
Discussion paper 
By Professor Jonathan Portes
 
CONTENTS
5
9
17
7 28
29
5FOREWORD
The UK’s economy and society depend on public services. The continuing failure to deliver 
quality of life and prosperity for all is eroding the social cohesion on which our society depends, 
and undermining its ability to address the significant environmental, demographic, health 
and work challenges that lie ahead. The UK is not only underperforming economically; it is 
floundering socially.
Real incomes are dropping, and opportunities for many communities around the country are 
restricted and eroding. It is a dismal picture, but what gives the greatest cause for concern is 
the lack of public debate about how to tackle the situation. A broad consensus has emerged 
since the crisis of 2008 that the untramelled pursuit of growth does not deliver quality of life for 
all. But the most common response to this challenge is to repeat the mantra that we cannot 
afford to invest more in public services due to the precarious state of the public finances. This 
is tantamount to saying that we cannot afford to invest in our citizens, in the people we live with 
and among.
At the Institute for Global Prosperity (IGP), we are committed to three things: public debate 
around new ideas; sustainable investment in social infrastructures; and public policy aimed 
at improving the quality of people’s lives. We have been inspired by experiments in universal 
basic income (UBI) around the world, and by a series of discussions about how to rethink 
economies, both local and global.  In this report, we lay out some ideas about how to deliver 
quality of life for the UK, improve public services in ways that are affordable, and link radical 
policy initiatves to improved social integration and cohesion. These are ideas for debate 
across the broadest spectrum in the UK, including local communities. We call this set of ideas 
Universal Basic Services.
Social Prosperity 
for the Future
by Professor Henrietta L. Moore,
Director of the UCL Institute for Global Prosperity
6Over four million people in Britain can’t put food on the table at some point each year and we 
need to ask: why is that? If poverty is the difference between the cost of basic living and available 
income,  arguably we have been overly focused on boosting incomes through redistributive tax 
systems and wage legislation. 
If we are to increase cohesion, the sense that we are “all in it together”, we must act where we 
can have the greatest impact and that is on the cost of basic living. Our research, presented 
in this paper, demonstrates unequivocally that money spent on basic services – the most 
fundamental building blocks for life required by every citizen in the 21st century - dramatically 
reduces the cost of basic living for the those on the lowest incomes. Basic services will reduce 
poverty because they will reduce the cost of a minimum living standard. Even if income levels 
remain static, it will make accessible a life that includes participation, builds belonging and 
common purpose and potentially strengthens the cohesion of society as a whole.
Focusing on basic services, such as housing, food, communications and transport, is, we 
conclude, far more effective at driving down the cost of living than spending the same money 
on existing services, or on redistribution. In the UK, basic healthcare and education are already 
free for all, and while further investment in those services is desirable, it will not affect the cost 
of living for those at the bottom of our society.
What we set out here is the blueprint for an enhanced but affordable social safety net. Following 
the Second World War, the British people through their elected government took a collective 
decision to institute the NHS - basing healthcare access on need rather than the ability to pay. 
In the 21st century, we have an opportunity to extend this principle and ‘raise the floor’ of what 
all citizens can expect. By so doing, we can create a solid platform for improving the quality of 
people’s lives and the prosperity of future generations.
Expanding universal access to basic services is the most effective way to bolster the public 
goods on which both society and the economy depend.  The benefits such investment in social 
infrastructure brings are much greater than those targeted at individuals.  What is clear is this: 
We can have a modern welfare state fit for the 21st century, and we can afford to pay for it. 
What remains now is a public debate about the validity and potential of the ideas we have on 
the table, so that we refine them, implement them, and generate the next set of ideas to fit the 
changing circumstances of sustainable prosperity for the UK today and for future generations.
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7THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE UK
Social housing units decreased by 20,000 be-
tween April 2012 and September 2014: 2,298 
were built, 22,899 homes were sold.2
Between 1980 and 2014 bus and coach fares 
increased by 58% and rail fares increased by 
63% in real terms.3
4 million children in poverty in the UK, 
and this figure is projected to rise to 5 million 
by 2020 as further social security cuts come 
into force.1 
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/households-below-average-income-199495-to-201415 
2 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/25/uk-population-at-record-high-with-net-migration-the-biggest-driver
3 https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2015-06-22.3443.h 
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84 Million people have difficulty putting 
food on the table each year.7
17% of people earning 
less than £20,000 nev-
er use the internet, as 
opposed to 2% of peo-
ple earning more than 
than £40,000.6
In England in 2015 there were 16,686 deaths from avoidable causes 
in the most deprived areas whereas there were less than half that 
number (7,247 deaths) in the least deprived areas.4
71% of students are 
STRESSED and ANXIOUS about 
money and meeting basic living 
costs.5
4 https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/measuringsocioeconomicinequalitiesinavoidablemortalityinenglandandwales2015
5 https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/aug/26/average-student-food-budget-less-than-25-a-week-nus
6 http://www.nominettrust.org.uk/sites/default/files/NT SoA 4 - Employment and the internet.pdf
7https://www.trusselltrust.org/2017/07/25/half-children-helped-foodbanks-summer-holiday-months-primary-school-students/ 8
9INTRODUCTION
Various policy approaches over the last 30 years have failed to make sufficient progress in 
delivering the balanced society we aspire to, and which we will need to navigate the challenges 
looming ahead of us now. 
Acknowledging that we are failing to deliver the necessary social cohesion, and failing to 
secure the productive capacity of our full population, we must also accept that there are limits 
to the fiscal burden that we can sustain, and that we have to act within those limits. 
The OBR's central projection for current policy is for public debt to reach 234% GDP within 
50 years, mostly caused by increases in costs related to mature demographics. Evidently we 
need a new vision that achieves a better balance, accepting the inevitable march of technology 
and demographics, providing essential social safety, and leaving space for the necessity for 
individual motivation. 
A modern economy needs a social safety net that is just as modern, and one that is more 
flexible and effective than the conditional benefits system we have inherited. 
The Social Prosperity Network was formed inside the IGP at UCL to address this conundrum, 
and our research has focused on social security structures as the nexus of these challenges. 
The great majority of the public budgets of modern societies are spent on social protection 
Universal Basic Services: 
A larger life for the 
ordinary person
By Andrew Percy
10
and support, directly influencing their private 
economies and the allocation of their resources. 
Progression through industrial, technical, and 
information revolutions brings the additional 
pressures of changing operagraphics (work) 
and mature demographics (ageing), both of 
which directly impinge on the social support 
systems of modern societies.
Our central finding is that an expansion 
of our concept of public services, and 
enhancing public goods that are shared 
by all, provides the catalyst to solve these 
problems sustainably, now and for the long-
term. Moving from a primarily redistributive 
model for social security to a primarily 
service-orientated model meets needs more 
directly, increases efficiency, reduces costs, 
facilitates a vibrant private economy, and 
buttresses the institutional fabric of society. 
An enhanced services model is also likely to 
increase social cohesion, enabling common 
acceptance of the limits imposed on us by the 
the  challenges of finance, ageing, productivity 
and environmental degradation.
Universally available public services have the 
potential to provide the flexible, need specific, 
and responsive support that could affordably 
replace much of the current conditional 
benefits system, while also preserving the 
value of remuneration, conforming with public 
attitudes, and building social institutional 
fabric at the same time.
Universal Basic Services address many of 
the real problems that other options raise: 
satisfying differentiated needs (e.g. disability, 
housing), general affordability, incremental 
implementation, political acceptability, and 
preserving the intrinsic value of monetary 
reward for contribution. In addition to Blundell’s 
"iron triangle" of social security (Controlling 
cost v Meeting need v Work incentives) we 
add political feasibility and resilient social 
institutional buttressing as required features 
of any sustainable new proposal. 
Universal access to Basic Services delivers a 
common floor to our society by guaranteeing 
a minimum standard of life as a practical and 
observable manifestation of our common 
purpose. A platform of basic services makes 
real the promise that a basic wage pretends 
to deliver. Basic or minimum wages aspire to 
deliver a basic standard of living but, as we 
know, they fail to do so for many. 
Photograph by Vladimir Kudinov
A “larger life for the ordinary person”, described by Roberto Un-
ger as the core purpose of progress and the key role for govern-
ment, fits with our view of the meaning of “social prosperity”. 
Key to a larger life is removing insecurity by extending public 
services to include all the elements that enable citizens to live a 
basic life, unconditional on income.
SOCIAL PROSPERITY
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INTRODUCTION
What are
Universal Basic Services?
Universal Basic Services (UBS) are a collection of 7 free public services that enable every 
citizen to live a larger life by ensuring access to safety, opportunity, and participation. 
We repurpose the idea of public services to look at the feasibility of extending the same 
principles of universal access, free at the point of need, which we already manifest in our 
National Health Service, our public education, our democracy, and our legal services (albeit 
with variable quality). To the 3 existing public services we add Shelter, Food, Transport and 
Information. In some fashion these have been, or are, delivered as limited public services, 
but to reap the maximum returns all of these need to be elevated to more fully fledged Basic 
Services.
Enabling every member of society to maintain their material safety, and the opportunity to use 
their own efforts to make their personal contribution to their society are the first two criteria 
for a Basic Service, to which we add the vital element of participation as necessary to the 
functioning of our democratic political system.
SAFETY
HEALTH
 
CARE
EDUCATION
LEGAL  &  
DEMOCRACY
+  SHELTER
FOOD
TRANSPORT
INFORMATION
OPPORTUNITY PARTICIPATION
Table 1: Reasons for Including Services in UBS.
+
+
+
+
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Exploring UBS
Modelling Basic Services
Shelter
For Shelter we use the widely accepted 
remedy of adding significantly to the existing 
stock of social housing. We model doubling 
the existing social housing stock by funding 
the building of 1.5 million new social housing 
units using 30 year Treasuries at current 
market rates. The new units would be offered 
on a needs basis at zero rent. All social 
housing would be exempted from Council 
Tax, and include a utilities allowance. With 
a 7 year building schedule the costs start at 
£6.1bn and finalise at £13bn from the 7th year 
onwards.
Food
To alleviate food insecurity in the UK we use 
the FSA survey results from 2016 as the 
basis for a Food service that would provide 
one third of the meals for the 2.2 million 
households (8%) deemed to experience 
food insecurity each year. This would add to 
existing programs such as free school meals 
and meals on wheels, providing 1.8 billion 
meals at a cost of £4bn/year.
Transport
For Transport  we examine extending the 
existing Freedom Pass (currently for citizens 
over the age of 60) to everyone for bus 
services. The objective being to provide 
access to free local public transport services 
that enable citizens and residents access to 
jobs, education, health care and participate 
fully in their community – all of which are 
currently under threat. Assuming an increase 
in use of 260% the cost would be £5bn/year.
Information
To promote digital inclusion the Information 
service covers the cost of basic phone, Internet 
and the BBC TV license fee. The objective 
being to enable access to work opportunities 
and other services, as well as participation in 
our democracy as informed citizens.
This is the most expensive service we 
considered with an annual budget of £20bn, 
however it also delivers universal value across 
all income groups and keeps all citizens 
connected in our increasingly digital world.
Photograph by Negative Space
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INTRODUCTION
Comparing UBS and UBI 
Basic Services & Income
Universal Basic Services (UBS) and Universal Basic Income (UBI) are complimentary 
components of a sustainable future for social welfare. Progressive proponents of a UBI 
assume the pre-existence of a platform of social welfare services, and advocates of UBS must 
acknowledge that there are both personal and specific needs that will require some form of 
monetary distribution to preserve freedom and agency.
Universal Basic Services provide a floor to our society by guaranteeing a minimum standard 
of life as a practical and observable manifestation of our common purpose. This basic platform 
of services makes real the promise that a minimum wage aspires to deliver. A minimum wage 
aims to deliver a basic standard of living, but in practice it only reduces poverty if it is set high, 
and if it is high: work will be decreased, compliance reduced, and/or prices raised. 
Common to both UBS and UBI is the idea that minimum wage levels denigrate and crowd out 
a multitude of small activities that are the foundation of prosperous and sustainable human 
society, by raising the lower limit on any activity that delivers less monetary value. Basic 
Services, on the other hand, actually deliver on the promise of a common floor to the standard of 
life of any citizen, replacing living costs for those that use the services, and increasing retained 
pay. This lowers the limit on marginal activities, making all kinds of small work worthwhile.
The debate between Basic Income and Basic Services revolves around the best use of available 
funds. There is always going to be competition between possible uses of finite tax revenues, 
and analysing the alternatives provides a framework for making these decisions. To enable 
this comparison our Technical Analyses show the option of using the same funds allocated to 
each Basic Service as a Basic Income instead.
Photograph by Pixabay
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Exploring UBS
Paying for Basic Services
Reducing the Personal Allowance to £4,300/year (leaving the current benefits system in place 
as is) would make UBS revenue neutral, and be highly progressive.
Key to understanding the effect of UBS is the “social wage” value of the services: £126 of net 
weekly earnings for an individual accessing all of the Basic Services. This demonstrates that 
UBS have the potential to increase retained earnings even if basic labour rates decreased by 
up to 30%, and at the same time build social capital, and increase opportunities by making 
previously marginal work viable.
The distributional impact of those services is highly progressive, addressing the “left behind” in 
our society by delivering the greatest impact for the lowest paid. On a purely financial analysis 
the effects are progressive, but even more significant impacts are likely to be in related areas 
such as accessing employment opportunities as other studies on the availability of services 
such as digital access and local transport have shown.
These effects provide further support to the argument that UBS provide an effective and cost 
efficient safety net that delivers on the “iron triangle” by holding down costs, meeting needs, 
and enhancing work incentives.
We believe UBS is an exciting new idea that offers an affordable path forward for modern 
economies struggling for balance between the inevitable changes brought about by changing 
operagraphics and demographics, and the need to maintain cohesion and solidarity.
Social Wage
A “social wage” is the value of a public service to 
an individual citizen, expressed as replacement for 
financial income.
Our research demonstrates that, contrary to 
popular imagination, Basic Services are well 
within reach of reasonable expenditures. 
Nevertheless they do, in aggregate, represent 
an increase in costs of 2.3% of GDP.
UBS Advantages
Meets needs more
 
directly
Services, by their nature, are used when and where there is demand for the service.
Services can target needs where means testing might miss specific deprivations.
Increases efficiency
The value delivered by services to individual recipients most often exceeds the cost of the 
service provision because the economies of scale achieved through generalised provision,
 
thus circumventing the premium of satisfying individual requirements purchased individually.
When services are locally designed and delivered with intimate knowledge and 
understanding of specific local circumstances efficiency can be further increased (by as 
much as 14% in 2014 LGA/RSA research).
Reduces costs
The feedback effect of a ﬂexible labour market: to the extent that the cost of UBS delivery 
contains labour costs then those costs are potentially reduced by the social wage attributed 
to enhanced social safety by labour contributors who are also UBS recipients.
Facilitates a vibrant
 
private economy
The increased social security provided by UBS allows a more ﬂexible labour market to arise 
without endangering social safety.
 
This more ﬂexible labour market increases labour
 
bargaining power, enables entrepreneurial initiative, allows labour rates to ﬂoat more 
responsively, and supports enhanced micro-economic activity such as environmentally
beneficial repair services.
Buttresses the 
institutional fabric UBS require social institutions and support the development of public service infrastructure.
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Exploring UBS
Costing Basic Services
The Technical Analyses attached look at the costs and distributional effects of the four services 
we propose to add in our definition of UBS: Shelter, Food, local Transport, and Information and 
communications access.
As can be seen in the summary tables below UBS meet needs much more directly for those 
on the lowest incomes in a society, and always deliver greater value for the same expenditure, 
than a cash distribution.
To the cost of the UBS we have added additional budget to fund the costs of more devolved 
local government capable of providing responsive and accountable service design and delivery.
Lastly we explore the measures that would be necessary to make these changes revenue 
neutral by adjusting the Personal Income Tax Allowance - see Paying for Basic Services on 
following page.
INTRODUCTION
UBS + 
UBI UBS Local  Democracy
Revenue 
Neutral 
Adjustment
Net  
Effect
+ UBI
Net - 
Revenue 
Neutral 
Adjustment
Definition
Shelter, 
Food, 
Transport & 
Information 
as above.
650 Local 
Assemblies with 
25 members each 
(@ £100k) and 50 
staff (@ £21.3k)
Personal 
Allowance 
reduced to 
£4,300
£/week
£20/week taxed, 
replacing Child 
Benefit  reducing 
JSA, pensions 
and disability
Personal 
Allowance 
reduced to £0
Cost £42.16 Bn £3.0 Bn Reduce PA by £7,200 £44.5 Bn Reduce PA by £4,300
D1 £83.23 / week - £7.27 / week + £75.96 + £3.13 / week
D1 user £126.46 / week - £7.27 / week + £119.19
Average 
Taxpayer D5-
D10
£20.21 / 
week
- £40.63 / 
week -£20.42 - £1.64 / week
+ 4 
UBS Shelter Food Transport Information
UBS
TOTAL
Definition
1.5 million new 
social housing 
units @ zero rent + 
Council Tax 
exemptions + 
utilities 
Food insecurity
1.8 billion meals
(7 meals/week)
Free local public 
transport
Basic cell phone, 
home Internet, BBC 
TV license
Cost £13.0 Bn £4.0 Bn £5.2 Bn £19.9 Bn £42.16 Bn
D1 effect £39.48 / week £24.88 / week £2.44 / week £5.43 / week £83.23 / week
User value £86.87 / week £12.96 / week £21.20 / week £5.43 / week £126.46 / week
UBI equiv £3.85 / week £1.19 / week £1.54 / week £5.88 / week
£12.47 / 
week
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Exploring UBS
Macro Fiscal 
Effects
The transformative effects of UBS are 
accessible with relatively minor changes to the 
fiscal structure of the UK economy. Additional 
UBS spending (and revenues) are just 2.3% 
of GDP, or 5% of existing budgets.
The charts on this page consolidate UK 
Government accounts for 2017/18 to show 
existing spending and revenues with the 
additional spending and revenues related to 
the UBS enhancements we propose.
Our proposal for a revenue neutral expansion 
of UBS using a reduction in the Personal 
Allowance spreads the cost across the income 
deciles while remaining very progressive – 
delivering 13% average increases in after 
tax incomes for the lowest paid 30% of the 
population, and requiring an average 3% 
increase in contribution from the highest paid 
70% of households.
Any increase in taxation and spending needs to be justified, and the reasons why UBS justify 
these changes are threefold:
• the increased flexibility in labour markets delivers value across the economy, stimulating new 
activity and increasing the size of the “pie”
• costs are restrained over the long term through a combination of greater efficiency and the 
“social wage” effect on labour rates
• sustainability limits to future fiscal, social and environmental activity are more broadly 
accepted by virtue of the increased social cohesion that the UBS enable
Household Income Decile
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1. Introduction and context
There has been a sharp rise in earnings inequality in the US and UK, and to a lesser extent in 
other developed countries, over the last 30 years.
Figure 4. 90:10 ratio for male hourly wages and net household income 1994 to 2014
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The general consensus amongst economists is that the primary driver has been technological 
change, although a number of other forces are also at work:
• Trade. Trade liberalisation and the adoption of market-oriented, outward-looking economic 
policies by many developing countries – in particular, but not exclusively, China – led to very rapid 
growth in world trade before the 2008 financial crisis.  In conventional models of international 
trade, this might have been expected to reduce earnings and/or employment for workers in 
industries that competed with imports from such countries. This could increase inequality if 
the wages in these sectors were lower than average. In practice, the skilled manufacturing 
workers who were most likely to lose out were not necessarily low paid, but were concentrated 
in certain geographical areas, so regional inequalities may have been aggravated;
• Immigration flows globally have risen, with sharp rises in flows to the UK, US and some 
(but not all) European countries. As with trade, migration flows might reduce earnings and/or 
employment for native workers most exposed to competition from new migrants.  However, 
the empirical literature in the UK does not suggest that immigration has had a major impact on 
wages or on wage inequality
• Labour market deregulation and the fall in trade union membership. Trade union membership 
has fallen in most industrialised countries, largely in parallel with the decline of manufacturing 
industry.  In the UK and US, trade unions are by and large now only a significant presence in 
the wider public sector, with low and falling levels of membership in the private sector.
Nevertheless, most empirical evidence suggests that technological developments are more 
important than any of these factors.  Very rapid growth in manufacturing productivity means that 
even though, despite trade, manufacturing output has not shrunk much, far fewer people (in 
practice, far fewer men) are employed in manufacturing.   Technological change has - thus far - 
favoured those who have skills (generally analytic and cognitive skills) that are complementary 
to new, ICT-enabled technologies, while disadvantaging those whose skills are relatively easy 
to automate. The result has been job creation and rising wages at the top end of the income 
scale accompanied by job creation and falling or stagnant wages for lower and lower-middle 
income workers, with fewer middle-income/ “middle-class” (in the US terminology) jobs.
This does not by any means mean that trade and other factors are irrelevant, because there 
are important linkages. Technology drives trade patterns, while labour market structures and 
regulation are influenced by underlying economic forces.  Recent work suggests that the 
impact of the decline in manufacturing resulting, at least in part, from trade, had very persistent 
and long-lasting impacts in the areas of the US most affected; this is consistent with casual 
observation in the UK. 
In the 1980s, the initial response to these trends by broadly free-market, conservative 
governments in the UK and US was one of benign (or sometimes malign) neglect, and inequality 
rose accordingly. However, progressive governments which came to power in the 1990s were 
presented with a dilemma; like their predecessors, they espoused a broadly free-market 
approach to economic policy, and a positive attitude to globalisation, including both trade and 
migration. At the same time, they attached a much higher value to equity and social cohesion 
than their 1980s predecessors.   Based on the view that, as set out above, the primary driver 
of increasing inequality was technology and in particular the increasing return to skills, the 
favoured policy response was a combination of strategies designed to a) redistribute the gains 
from economic growth via the tax and benefit system and b) make the skill distribution more 
equal via the education system. 
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However, this strategy had only limited success. While it did (especially in the UK) succeed in 
mitigating any further rise in income inequality, earnings inequality continued to rise, despite 
some modest improvements in education outcomes, with particularly large gains in the top 
1-2 % of the earnings distribution. At the same time, there was a significant rise in regional 
disparities, in the UK and elsewhere, as many areas that had been reliant on manufacturing 
and heavy industry found it difficult to replace skilled jobs that were lost, while at the same time 
high productivity service industries grew quickly in London and the greater South-East.
Moreover, in the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis, this strategy appears to have run its 
course. Political support in the UK for redistribution via the tax and benefit system began to fall 
around the turn of the millennium, and reached a low point just after the 2008-09 crisis. Since 
then it has rebounded a little but remains relatively low:  it seems likely that it was this lack of 
political support for relatively high levels of redistribution which made the various regressive 
changes to the system implemented since 2010 politically sustainable.
2. New challenges
Looking forward, some of the existing pressures on UK workers are likely to intensify, while 
new challenges are emerging:
 
• The UK has long had a “productivity problem”, with output per hour considerably lower than 
in the US, France or Germany. Over the quarter century before the financial crisis, some 
progress was made towards closing this gap, with productivity growing at approximately 2 
percent a year. However, since the crisis, productivity growth has been very slow in almost all 
developed economies, but particularly weak in the UK (and Italy) despite the UK’s relatively 
good economic performance overall.  While in previous recoveries the UK has usually made 
up for lost ground relatively quickly, in this one productivity has consistently failed to recover 
to pre-crisis trends (let alone to the levels that would have been implied by pre-crisis trends).  
• Low productivity growth in turn means that real wage growth has been very subdued, even 
during the recovery, with real wages still perhaps 15% below the level implied by pre-crisis 
trends.  While wages have begun to grow over the last two years – albeit slowly by the standards 
of previous recoveries – the likely rise in inflation over the next year means that even this may 
be short-lived.
• While it is very difficult to measure, there is considerable evidence of the growth of “precarious” 
work; a term covering a variety of  (not mutually exclusive) phenomena, including zero-hours 
contracts, the growth of freelancing/consultancy, relatively low-waged and/or artificial self-
employment and some aspects of the “gig economy”.   These phenomena may have contributed 
to lower wages; at the same time, they may also account for the UK’s very good employment 
performance over the last decade.
• The increasing vulnerability of (some) jobs to automation.  The continued rapid advance of 
ICT will certainly reshape the labour market, although it is difficult ex ante to predict precisely 
what jobs will be most vulnerable. However, developments such as driverless cars, drones 
and the development of “intelligent” systems that can deal with at least some tasks currently 
undertaken by humans clearly have the potential to threaten occupations which currently 
account for significant proportions of employment.
At first sight, it seems difficult to reconcile continued low productivity and high employment 
in the UK with the threat of automation – clearly the robots are not (yet) taking all our jobs. 
DISCUSSION PAPER
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There are a number of hypotheses that might account for this: for example, we might still be 
a transitional phase, where the negative effects of automation on overall employment levels 
have not yet occurred, with labour market flexibility ensuring that employment remains high 
during the transition period . Or it may be that automation simply functions to displace workers 
from one type of low-skilled employment to another, resulting in increased insecurity without 
any gain in wages or productivity.  But in any case, the following appear to be likely for at least 
the medium term:
• Continued or increased high levels of low-waged, low-skilled employment;  accompanied by 
low levels of job security and career development;
• Some risk of more widespread job losses; but in any case continued levels of “churn” for 
those in low-skilled employment; and potential vulnerability of medium/high skilled workers in 
some sectors. 
• Continued high levels of earnings inequality.  To the extent that technology/automation 
does increase overall output per capita and/or productivity, the returns are likely to go 
disproportionately to those whose inputs are relatively scarce and/or have the labour market 
power to capture them. This is likely to mean workers with scarce technical or analytic skills, 
owners/managers/entrepreneurs in new and dynamic firms, shareholders of such firms, and 
senior managers/executives in large firms. 
• This in turn is likely to make it steadily more difficult to finance the welfare state, and public 
services more broadly, on the current model, since the state will become steadily more 
dependent on tax revenues from a relatively small proportion of the population with high 
earnings (a phenomenon which is already visible in the UK tax system) who may become 
more reluctant to finance a system which becomes more redistributive and more easily able to 
avoid or evade taxation. 
• Demographic pressures, and in particular the impact of population ageing, will also affect 
both the labour market and the financing of the welfare state. To the extent care is provided 
by the state, relatively unskilled labour will still be required (currently social care provision is 
under pressure from lack of funding, upward pressure on wages from increases in the minimum 
wage, and restrictions on immigration); to the extent it is provided by family members, this will 
increase the need for workers to have greater control over working patterns. 
It is worth noting that this is in some sense a “Marxist” vision of the economy and labour 
market - with the modification that the returns from the dynamic innovation promoted by post-
industrial capitalism go less to the owners of physical capital and more to those who either 
have intellectual capital or ownership rights in firms which own the products of such capital. 
The political consequences of all these developments, taken together do not appear likely 
to be benign, as the vote for Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the rise of various 
nationalist/populist parties in other European countries demonstrates. Instead of leading to 
greater support for redistributive policies at a national level or measures to reform or rebalance 
labour markets, the primary reaction so far has been to blame these developments on external 
forces (immigrants, trade, the EU, etc)
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3. Possible responses:
The prognosis sketched out above is obviously an unattractive one.  What then are the possible 
policy responses? 
• Accommodation, or “back to the 1980s”; that is, allow inequality to grow, restrain the 
growth in benefit expenditure/public spending as far as possible, and maintain employment 
through tightening welfare conditionality and continuing with the current model of a “flexible” but 
insecure labour market. This would lead, as in the 1980s, to widening inequality and poverty. 
As in the 1980s, “benign neglect” is (at least from anything other than an extreme free-market 
perspective) unlikely to lead to acceptable outcomes;
• “Back to the 2000s”: this would entail a renewed focus on educational attainment of the 
least well off; a return to the active redistribution policies of the 2000s (tax credits, etc), within 
the framework of the current tax and benefit system; and an attempt to revitalise support for 
state-funded public services.  The evidence of the 2000s suggests that this might help mitigate 
rising income inequality, but may run up against diminishing returns, and is of questionable 
political saleability.
• Basic income. The idea of a “basic” or “citizens” income is an old idea with new traction 
(often associated with Milton Friedman’s “negative income tax”).  Under the simplest and most 
radical versions all citizens would be paid an unconditional basic income, regardless of work 
status.  All income would be taxed, either on a flat rate basis or, as now, on a progressive 
basis. Proponents of basic income argue that it has the potential to address a number of the 
issues set out above: 
However, there are also significant potential issues with the basic income approach;
• while basic income can smooth work incentives, it cannot get over the tradeoffs inherent in 
any tax and benefit system; it is only possible to improve work incentives on average if the 
poorest are made worse off, while if the poorest are broadly protected than any changes mean 
that some people will face worse incentives to work. The simplest possible version of the 
basic income approach, as described above, would improve work incentives for the poor, but 
(at most plausible tax rates) make those without work poorer; and would benefit the very rich. 
Alternative versions which attempt to avoid these impacts would require, effectively, significant 
increases in taxes on the better off;
• basic income does not directly address the two most expensive and problematic aspects of 
the current UK welfare system; disability and incapacity related benefits and help with housing 
costs. In particular, while basic income eliminates work-related conditionality, it is by definition 
impossible to have a system of disability-related benefits that do not incorporate some form of 
test to determine disability status. Existing proposals for a UK citizen’s income avoid this issue 
o It could both simplify and improve work incentives for lower paid workers, by removing 
the current complex interactions of benefits, tax credits and taxes, and replacing them 
with a single tax rate;
o By removing the current work-related conditionality attached to unemployment-related 
benefits, it would shift the balance of power in the labour market to workers (especially 
the low skilled), enabling such workers to work more flexibly (but with the flexibility in the 
hands of the worker not the employer) and to take more risks (such as starting a new 
business or investing in training).
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4. Universal basic services
In this paper we outline an alternative approach - universal basic services (UBS). This is 
related to, but quite distinct from, basic income. UBS would build on the existing system of 
state provision of some services, but extend it; under UBS a basket of basic services would 
be financed by taxation, replacing in part some cash benefits.  The services themselves might 
be provided publicly, by private companies, or by the voluntary sector.  Ultimately, the broad 
objective of UBS would be to extend the public provision of services as far as possible to enable 
individuals to live at a basic standard at significantly less direct financial cost: covering not 
only healthcare and school-age education needs as at present, but also transport, information 
access, and eventually shelter and food, all of which are generally considered essential to full 
participation in a modern developed economy.
There are a number of different and overlapping rationales for state provision of services:
• Externalities and/or spillovers; that is, that the benefits to society are greater than to the 
individual consumer. This potentially applies to a wide range of services, from public transport 
(where use of public transport may reduce congestion or pollution) to child vaccination (which 
makes onward transmission of disease less probable as well as benefiting the individual child 
vaccinated)
• Economies of scale or scope. Some services, particularly those that are most efficiently 
provided through networks, have large economies of scale or scope that mean that they are 
“natural monopolies” in whole or in part. Historically, this led to state provision, to maximise 
such efficiencies, to ensure equitable access and to prevent the exploitation of monopoly 
power, although in recent years many such industries have been privatised, with government 
regulation rather than direct state ownership.
• Imperfect information, moral hazard, or myopic decision making.  Information failures and 
asymmetries are pervasive in, for example, healthcare: for this reason in most countries health 
care is to a greater or lesser extent either provided by the state or by heavily regulated, often 
non-profit providers with a large element of state finance;
by suggesting preserving broadly the current system; but that means much of the hoped-for 
gains from simplification are ruled out ex ante;
• basic income is very expensive to implement as anything bigger than a relatively small 
payment, certainly insufficient to provide even basic subsistence with the current configuration 
of the welfare system. For example, a income paid to all UK citizens (including children) at the 
current Jobseekers Allowance level of £73.10 would cost just under £250bn per year - around 
13% of total UK Gross Domestic Product, or 31% of current UK budget.  The more modest and 
realistic scheme modelled by Howard Reed of Landman Economics for the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, which includes a payment of £60 per week for each adult over 25, would have a 
net cost of about £140 billion. However, as noted above, this would leave the current system 
of means-tested benefits largely untouched.
More fundamentally, basic income raises a number of philosophical and political issues about 
intrinsic value of work, or purposeful activity more broadly. There is very strong evidence that 
individuals’ connection to the labour market is important not just for income but also for well-
being more generally, and for a variety of longer-term outcomes. For the reasons above, we 
argue that while some version of a basic income may be a useful complement to ambitious 
reforms of the welfare system, expecting basic income on its own to be “the answer” is neither 
realistic nor desirable.
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• Common culture, citizenship and values.  These considerations are more amorphous, but 
underpin the rationale for state financing of the arts, and the provision of free or subsidised 
cultural events; or of state broadcasting like the BBC.
For some services more than one of the above may apply. For example, free state provision 
of universal compulsory education is sometimes justified by reference to externalities (the 
economy as a whole, and hence the population as a whole, suffer if a significant number 
of people are not properly educated); sometimes with respect to myopic decision making or 
asymmetric incentives (parents might not act in the long-term best interests of their children); 
and sometimes by reference to the perceived need to instil common values.
More broadly, ensuring that every citizen has access to a basket of basic services that enables 
them to participate in society is consistent with a “capabilities” approach to inequality; that is, 
the role of the state is to ensure an equitable distribution of not (just) money but opportunity 
to participate and contribute to society. For that to be meaningful there are likely to be certain 
services everyone should be able to access. In this model poverty is not directly a matter of 
relative (or absolute) income but of access to opportunities, the prerequisites for which will 
change over time, and ensuring such access is the responsibility of the state.
In recent decades, there has been a move away from the provision of universal services at 
free or low cost towards “targeting”, as this was seen as the most efficient use of constrained 
public resources.   Prescription charges were introduced by Labour relatively soon after the 
introduction of the NHS, and free milk for young children was withdrawn by Mrs Thatcher as 
Education Secretary. Under Thatcher as Prime Minister, prices were raised very substantially 
for prescriptions, school meals, public transport, with (sometimes real, sometimes notional) 
“compensation” for those on benefits being given via the benefit system.  However, during the 
last election, it was notable that universalism made something of a comeback – proposals in 
the Conservative manifesto to end the universal provision of free school meals for younger 
children were highly unpopular, as was the so-called “dementia” tax, while Labour’s proposals 
to cut tuition fees for higher education appears to have attracted significant support. A move 
to UBS – representing a swing back from the view that the redistributive aspects of the welfare 
state should largely operate through targeted cash payments - might be more in tune with the 
public mood than at any time in recent years. 
The potential advantages of such an approach, relative to the current position, would be: 
• UBS, like basic income, has the potential to improve work incentives, especially for lower paid 
workers.   It reduces the cash income required (through the benefit system, or from savings) 
for individuals or families to survive at an acceptable standard of living if they have little or no 
income from labour; and if services are provided to all regardless  of work status, then there 
is no disincentive effect from the loss of access as people move into work or increase their 
earnings;
• UBS, if financed by a tax system that is (as the current UK system is) broadly proportional to 
income, is likely to be progressive; while not all service provision benefits those at the bottom 
most (in absolute terms), the net impact if financed by progressive taxation will almost always 
be positive;
• Moreover, to the extent that UBS increases demand, the impact will be particularly well 
targeted (rich people do not use foodbanks, nor will they respond to the provision of, say, free 
public transport as much as poor people), yet at the same time without the adverse impact on 
work incentives of targeted cash benefits;
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• Unlike a basic income, UBS does not necessarily require a wholesale reshaping of the tax 
and benefit system; it could be introduced incrementally, as an alternative to increases in 
cash benefits, while keeping the broad structure of the current tax and benefit system broadly 
unchanged. 
• Some basic services - for example transport and communications - are complementary 
to work or work search (or other purposeful activity). This means that the provision of such 
services can potentially improve employment prospects and/or improve work incentives while 
at the same time being progressive in their economic incidence;
• Related to this, and more broadly, while a basic income arguably does little or nothing to 
build social capital or to reverse what some see as social atomisation, UBS could be “pro-
social”; publicly provided services are a visible collective good, and both providing them and 
consuming them is at least in part a social activity;
• While there is ample evidence that most people regard poverty as a relative phenomenon 
– you don’t have to be starving to be poor in the UK – the relative income poverty measure 
is difficult to communicate and does not necessarily chime with public views either, while a 
measure based on access to (perceived) “necessities” (as with the JRF’s Minimum Income 
Standards) is easier to communicate.  UBS fits much more closely with this than either basic 
income or tax credits/Universal Credit. It also can be presented in part as an attempt by the 
state to (partially) equalise opportunities or capabilities to participate in society, rather than 
outcomes.
• UBS – particularly if conditional on contribution or citizenship – is aligned more closely with 
public attitudes to citizens’ rights and responsibilities, and hence are more likely to be politically 
sustainable over the medium term.
An important aspect of UBS would be the opportunity it could give to rejuvenate local democracy 
and local involvement in the design, financing and delivery of local services. Almost all public 
services are, necessarily, delivered locally, but there is an inevitable tension between national 
standards and local autonomy and control.  While with some existing universal services – 
especially health – there is a very strong public view that quality of service and access to 
services should be broadly uniform, that need not be the case for all services. Responsive, 
effective and accountable local government – with financial autonomy – will be necessary for 
the practical implementation of UBS.
UBS need not be inconsistent, and could indeed be complementary, with a basic income 
introduced at a modest level, as modelled in the Technical Analysis II by Howard Reed and 
Andrew Percy attached.
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5. UBS: some illustrations
What would a move towards the provision of UBS look like in practice?  Two technical analyses 
have been prepared by Howard Reed, (Landman Economics), working with Andrew Percy 
(IGP). The first  models detailed costs and the beneficiaries of two services that might be 
argued to be good candidates for a UBS approach: communications (including broadband, a 
basic phone package, and the TV license) and local public transport services (including bus 
transport, and, where relevant other local transport services (tube, tram, DLR, local overground 
trains, etc). 
More ambitiously, in the second analysis, Reed and Percy model more ambitious policy 
options which would represent a further extension of the UBS approach. These include a major 
programme to provide new social housing; the direct provision of free meals to those current 
experiencing food insecurity; and an individual basic income “supplement” of £20 per week.
The key results are from the first analysis are:
•  Providing free communication services might cost in the region of £15-20 billion, or about 1 
percent of GDP.  The benefits would be spread fairly uniformly over the population, meaning 
that if financed by taxation the net impact would be progressive (if financed by lump-sum taxes 
or equivalent changes to the tax and benefit system, the impact would be broadly neutral)
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Value of free information services for households in the 2014 LCF 
as percentage of net income
•  Providing free local transport services might cost in the region of £5-10 billion, with the 
wide range reflecting uncertainty as to how much demand would be likely to increase.  Local 
transport is quite progressive in its impact, so if financed by taxation the net impact would 
be strongly progressive (so even if financed in part by reductions in benefits, it could still be 
broadly progressive)
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Value of free bus services for working age households in the 2014 
LCF as percentage of net income
These illustrative examples show that – contrary to some assumptions – the provision of services 
can in fact be relatively well targeted, without necessarily having a negative impact on work 
incentives.  But it is important to note that these are purely static distributional impacts: they 
take no account of the wider benefits that are posited above (but are difficult to model) such as 
the impact on labour supply or broader measures of social capital. 
The second analysis is more illustrative in nature; in particular, the options modelled would not 
be “universal” in the sense of providing free housing to all, or even to all those who would take 
up an offer of free, basic social housing; similarly the food program modelled is one that would 
end “food insecurity” rather than provide free food to all or even to all those on low incomes. 
The objective of this analysis is rather to show the likely broad impacts and distributional 
consequences of a substantial increase in state provision of services in these areas.  
On the assumption that take up of these additional services would be overwhelming concentrated 
among the lower deciles  of the income distribution, the benefits to the least well-off would be 
very large:
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Obviously the costs of provision would have to be financed, presumably from taxation. Reed 
models the overall impact if the package were to be financed by a reduction in the personal 
allowance; to raise £45 billion, roughly equivalent to the modelled cost, would require the per-
sonal allowance to be reduced from £11,500 to £4,300.  The overall distributional impact of 
the combined, revenue-neutral package is shown below. Unsurprisingly, given the assumed 
profile of service users, the impact would be extremely progressive, as the chart shows:
6. Questions/issues for discussion
In our view the above analysis, combined with the illustrative modelling, illustrates the potential 
for a UBS-approached to be feasible and progressive and to address some of the key medium 
to long-term social challenges discussed above. Of course, this is very much preliminary work. 
To advance this debate further, a number of key questions are worth considering:
 a) What are likely labour market impacts of greater provision of basic services (including not 
just static impacts on work incentives, but structural changes to labour supply behaviour and 
labour markets) 
b) How would access to UBS be regulated or controlled? Would it be restricted to citizens/
residents? If so, how would this be monitored and policed?
c) To what extent should decisions on the provision of services be taken at national or local 
level? What are the appropriate mechanisms for democratic control?
d) Where is the potential greatest for positive externalities and/or spillovers (that is, what 
forms of pro-social behaviour do we want to encourage) from an economic, social or 
environmental perspective?
e) Is UBS one “big idea” (as basic income is often presented) or a series of little ones, to be 
looked at on a case-by-case basis?  Would extending UBS beyond relatively “manageable” 
services like transport into much wider, more diverse policy areas, like housing or food, be 
practicable?
f) More broadly, what is the appropriate role of cash benefits and work-related conditionality 
in a 21st welfare state; and what is the role of the state in providing free or low-cost services?
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Method 1: Analysis of current cost of providing broadband and mobile packages. 
Based on analysis of leading providers (BT, TalkTalk, PlusNet etc), the cost of a basic broadband 
package appears to be approximately £20 per month, or just above this level. Based on this 
information, this research has assumed that the cost of a basic broadband package is £5 per 
week per household. 
For mobiles, the cost of a basic mobile package (including basic handset) appears to be around 
£15 per month based on an analysis of the packages available from leading providers. This 
research has assumed that the cost of a basic phone and calls package is £3.50 per week per 
person (so therefore, the value of phone services to each household will vary with the size of 
the household). Currently it is assumed that each adult receives phone services but children 
do not. (This assumption can of course be changed in subsequent research so that e.g. older 
children also receive phone services, if desired). 
This means that the cost of telecommunications based on evidence from providers is assumed 
to be £5 per household per week for broadband, plus £3.50 per adult per week for calls. 
Method 2: Analysis of telephone and internet expenditure in the Living Costs 
and Food Survey (LCF)
A combined variable for 'expenditure on communications' was constructed using the 2014 
Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF) data. The variable combines expenditure on phone calls 
(including mobiles and landline) and 'internet'. 
The percentiles of the distribution of weekly household expenditure in the LCF are as follows 
(note that the data asks for weeklyised expenditure from the most recent bill rather than just 
expenditure in the most recent week as that might be zero depending on the billing period):
Part 1: Cost of providing basic services
1.1  Cost of providing information services
In this project it is assumed that "information services" comprise the following three components: 
 (a) broadband; 
 (b) a basic telephone package;
 (c) the TV licence.  
Two different methods have been used to calculate the cost of telecommunications, as 
explained below. Cost estimates calculated using these methods have also been compared 
with evidence from the Minimum Income Standards (MIS) research conducted by researchers 
at the University of Loughborough for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.  countries, over the 
last 30 years.
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Table 1. Household communications expenditure, 2014 Living Costs 
and Food Survey: percentiles of distribution
Table 2. Average weekly expenditure on information per household by 
household income decile
Average expenditure on information per household by household income decile using the two 
different methods above
The distributional analysis in Part 2 below uses LCF expenditure on communications up to the median level 
as a proxy for 'basic' communications services, and assumes that any household with expenditure above the 
median has median levels of 'basic' expenditure (which we assume to be covered by basic service provision) 
and then above the median is 'non-basic' expenditure (which isn't covered).
Method 2 shows somewhat lower average expenditure per household than Method 1. This is partially down 
to the fact that not all households have positive expenditure for internet and/or phone calls in the LCF data. 
This is because not all households make use of the internet (although a majority do), and also while the vast 
majority of households (around 99%) have some kind of phone, some households are likely to use pay-as-
you-go mobiles rather than a permanent contract and so may not show any expenditure on phone calls in 
LCF. 
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Table 3 shows that the amount for household services for a couple pensioner does not seem 
particularly out of line with our estimates of information costs using using Methods 1 and 2. 
The amount for a single working age person is somewhat lower, because in the MIS focus 
groups it was felt that single working age people could get by without a landline and use a 
basic data package for internet access through their mobile phone instead. For the purposes 
of this project, it was felt more appropriate to include landline broadband as part of a universal 
services offer to all adult individuals. For parents, landline broadband was included in the MIS 
estimates; the cost of household services for these groups are higher than the estimates in 
Table 2 of the current report largely because of the inclusion of babysitting costs in the MIS 
household services calculations. 
Table 3. Minimum Income Standards for 'Household Services' for four family 
types, April 2016
Family type
Single adult, 
working age
Couple,  
pensioner
Couple, two 
children  
(one aged 2-4; 
one primary 
school age)
Lone parent,  
one child  
(aged 0-1)
Budget for 
'household 
services' (£/
week)
2.96 7.75 12.45 17.27
TV licence expenditure
Based on a current TV licence fee of £145.50 per household it is assumed that TV licence fee 
expenditure is £2.80 per household per week.
The overall aggregate cost of providing information services free at point-of-use, 
using each of these methods, is estimated at: 
 • £19.9 bn (Method 1);
 • £16.5 bn (Method 2). 
Comparison of cost of communications services with JRF 
Minimum Income Standards research
The JRF Minimum Income Standards research for 20161 includes phone and broadband 
services in the category of household services (which also includes expenditure on postal 
services and babysitting, but not childcare, which has its own separate category). Table 3 
below shows the MIS for household services for a selection of different household types in 
2016. Note that these calculations do not include the cost of the TV licence for each household.
1 Davis, Hill, Hirsch and Padley, A Minimum Income Standard for the UK in 2016, 
https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/minimum-income-standard-uk-2016 
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Table 4. Analysis of bus journey frequency in National Travel Survey, 2014
1.2 Cost of providing free local transport
The definition of 'local transport'
Two different definitions were used in this analysis: 
 Definition 1: bus transport only
 Definition 2: bus transport plus other local transport services (tube, tram, DLR, local  
 overground trains, etc)
Definition 2 is, for the most part, only relevant to London and other cities with non-bus local 
public transport infrastructure. 
 
Method 1: Using transport statistics
Definition 1 (using DfT statistics) 
Statistics from the Department for Transport on concessionary travel in England in  the year 
2015-162 show that the Government issued a total of 9.9 million older and disabled travel 
passes in England in 2015/16. Travel Concession Authorities (TCAs) spent an estimated £1.15 
billion on providing statutory and discretionary concessions. This suggests that the cost of a 
concession is £116.16 per year = £2.25 per person per week (approximately). 
To check whether the cost might be greater for working age people than pensioners (because 
working age people might use the bus more regularly if it were free at point-of-use) this project 
analysed the frequency of bus use for pensioners and working-age respondents in the National 
Travel Survey in 2014. Table 4 gives the results from this analysis. Currently, pensioners are 
more likely to make frequent bus trips than working age adults, and also pensioners are more 
likely to use the bus at all than working age adults. Of course, it is very likely that working age 
bus use would increase if bus travel were made free at the point of use for working age adults, 
but Table 4 at least suggests that the cost of free bus travel per person for working age person 
is unlikely to be substantially greater than the cost of free bus travel for pensioners (and indeed 
it could be less expensive per person).
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/560716/concessionary-travel-statistics-year-ending-march-2016.pdf
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Definition 2 (using London Councils' statistics on the cost of the London Freedom 
Pass, in aggregate and per user)  
Data from London Councils' statistics on Freedom Pass usage3 show that the total cost of 
Freedom Pass concessionary fares in London in 2016-17 was £333.9m. 
Additional info from London statistics on the cost of the concessionary freedom pass, in 
aggregate and per user
The total cost of the London Freedom Pass per user per week is calculated to be £5.31 per 
week, which breaks down into £3.83 per week for buses and £1.48 per week for other transport. 
Table 5 below shows how this amount was calculated.
Table 5. Calculations of cost of London Freedom Pass per user per week
3 http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/services/taxicard/taxi-
card-and-freedom-pass-borough-portal/usage-statistics-2016-17
£m
Total TFL apportionment, 2016-17 tax year 333.9
Of which:
Bus 241.0
All other LT excl. buses (e.g. tube, tram, DLR, London 
Overground etc)
92.9
Number of Freedom pass users 1.211 million
Cost per freedom pass user per year: £
Bus 199.01
Tube etc 76.71
Cost per freedom pass user per week: £
Buses 3.83
Tube etc 1.48
Total 5.31
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Table 6. Transport expenditure in the Living Costs and Food Survey 2014
Method 2: Living Costs and Food Survey
The Living Costs and Food Survey collects data on expenditure on bus fares, bus fares/tube 
fares,  and rail fares (including season ticket purchases). Table 6 below shows:
 • average spending per working-age household across the whole sample;
 • average spending per working-age household for households that had any positive  
   expenditure on bus/tube/rail;
 • the proportion of households with positive expenditure.
Table 6 shows that average expenditure per week on bus fares across all working age 
households in the 2014 LCF is £1.92 per week. This is much lower than average expenditure 
on train fares. Only just under a fifth of working age households have positive expenditure on 
buses (we would expect this figure to increase if bus transport were made free at point of use). 
Using the data from the Living Costs and Food Survey on average expenditure per week 
on bus services, the cost of extending free bus transport to non-pensioners is estimated to 
be approximately £2.0bn, and the cost of extending free bus and tube transport at £2.9bn. 
However, an alternative calculation based on the cost of the current concessionary bus 
scheme for pensioners and extending the scheme to the whole population, based on 
population size, produces an estimate of around £5.2bn. This seems more realistic, given 
that making bus travel free at point-of-use would certainly lead to an increase in the number 
of trips undertaken. Extending a more extensive concessionary scheme (along the lines of the 
London Freedom Pass) to the whole UK population would cost around £12.3 billion, but this is 
certainly an overestimate (given current levels of transport infrastructure) because most of the 
UK population outside the major cities does not have access to tube-type or tram-type public 
transport services. 
Therefore, the calculation of the value of local public transport services to house-
holds in this project, it has been decided to use the £5.2bn estimate (for bus 
services only) at a UK-wide level.
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Part 2: Distributional impact of providing basic services free at 
point-of-use
2.1 Information services
Figure 1 below shows the value of the cash equivalent of free information services for 
households in the 2014 Living Costs and Food Survey, classified by household income decile 
(the households with the lowest equivalised net incomes in decile 1, and then decile 2, and so 
on... up to the richest households in decile 10). 
The cash-equivalent value of information services is higher for richer households than for 
poorer households on average using valuation Method 2, but the differences are not great. 
For valuation Method 1 there is a smaller difference between deciles than for Method 1 and 
the income profile of the value of information services is reasonably flat for the top six deciles 
using Method 1.
Figure 2 shows the same data but as a percentage of average household net incomes in 
each decile. Whichever method is used to calculate the value of information services, they are 
strongly progressive as a proportion of net income (i.e. worth more to poorer households as a 
proportion of net income than richer households). 
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Figure 4 shows the distributional impact of free bus services as a percentage of net incomes 
(again, the vertical axis is drawn to the same scale as for Figure 2). As with information services, 
bus services are worth much more as a proportion of net income to poorer households than to 
richer households. 
2.2 Bus services
Figure 3 shows the cash equivalent value of bus services. (This analysis uses the pattern of 
LCF expenditure on buses for working age households and then scales up the value of this 
expenditure so that the value of bus services grosses up to £5.2 billion across all households, 
using the calculation in the previous section). 
The pattern of bus use by household income decile is somewhat uneven; this reflects some 
outliers (i.e. individual households with particularly high expenditure on bus fares). 
Figure 3 has been presented using the same vertical axis scale as Figure 1 so that it is easy 
to compare the value to households of information and bus services across the two graphs.
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Part 3: Distributional analysis of the impact of revenue-neutral 
packages for the provision of Information and Transport services 
free at point-of-use, financed by tax increases
3.1  Financing Information services using either tax rate increases or reductions 
in the Personal Allowance
Update - July 2017
Since this Technical Analysis was completed in in May we have produced an 
updated analysis that combines all of the UBS, including Food and Shelter, into a 
single revenue neutral distributional analysis based on a reduction in the Personal 
Income Tax Allowance. See attached Technical Analysis II.
A combined VAT/income tax package
This package takes the aggregate value of information services calculated using method 1 
above (£19.9bn) and combines provision of these services with tax increases as follows:
 
 a) increase of 2 percentage points in the standard rate of VAT, to 22% total (raises  
 £11.5bn according to HMRC ready reckoner)
 b) increase of 2p in basic rate income tax, to 22% (raises £9bn). 
The total sum raised by the tax increases is £21.5bn – more than enough to pay for the service 
package. Figure 5 shows the average distributional impact of the combined services and tax 
package in weekly cash terms for each household net income decile. There are average gains 
from the package in deciles 1 to 6 and average losses for deciles 7 and above. 
RESULTS AND TECHNICAL APPENDIX I
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Reducing the income tax personal allowance
Figures 7 and 8 show the distributional impact of free information services financed by an 
alternative tax package: reducing the value of the personal allowance for income tax by £2,800, 
from its 2016-17 value of £11,000 to £8,200. This raises around £20bn, almost precisely 
offsetting the cost of providing information services free at point-of-use valued using method 1. 
Figure 6 shows the same results but as a percentage of household net income by decile. The 
results show that the package is strongly progressive. While households in the lowest income 
decile gain by 3.7% of their net incomes on average, and households in the second decile by 
2.2%, households in the top two deciles experience average losses equivalent to 0.7% of their 
incomes.
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As with the VAT/income tax package in Figure 5, Figure 7 shows average gains overall for 
the bottom six deciles and losses for the top four deciles. The pattern of net impacts is slightly 
different here, with the change in the cash impact across deciles being more linear than for 
Figure 5.
Figure 8 shows the distributional impact of financing free information services via a reduction 
in the personal allowance as a percentage of net incomes by decile. The impact of the package 
is slightly more progressive at the bottom end of the income distribution with this package than 
for the income tax/VAT rates package analysed in Figure 6. The lowest income decile gains by 
around 7% on average here compared with only around 4% in Figure 6.
3.2  Financing transport services with an increase in National Insurance 
contributions
This package takes the aggregate estimate of the cost of extending free bus services across 
the whole UK population calculated above (£5.2bn) and funds it using an increase of 1 
percentage point in employee and self-employed National Insurance contributions across the 
whole earnings range (including above the upper earnings limit and upper profits limit). 
This means that the NICs rates would now be 13% below the UEL and 3% above the UEL for 
employees, and 10% below the UPL and 3% above the UPL for Class 4 self-employed. 
According to the HMRC ready reckoner these combined reforms raise £5.2bn – exactly the 
same as the cost of extending bus services. Thus, this is a truly revenue-neutral package if the 
cost and spending estimates are accurate. 
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Figure 9 shows the impact of the package in cash terms (using the same vertical scale as 
Figure 5). The average cash impact is positive for deciles 1-5, roughly neutral in deciles 6-8 
and negative in the top two deciles. 
Figure 10 shows the impacts as a percentage of net income. The package is progressive, with 
particularly large gains in the lowest two deciles. 
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Part 1: Cost of Shelter & Food Basic Services
The UK’s housing is abnormally dysfunctional amongst developed societies, and any solution 
involves adding substantially to the housing stock through a building program.
In 2016 4.5M people in poverty lived in the private rented sector, and 73% of bottom two 
income deciles pay more than one third of their income in rent1, while 14% of all private renters 
pay more than 50% of their income in rent2.
In considering a Shelter UBS we are concerned with the development of a basic public service 
and we assume that the same investments and regulatory changes that will be required in any 
case3 are part of the base case on which we build the Shelter UBS. 
To provide a model for how a Shelter UBS would work we use the option to build 1.5M new 
social housing units (more than doubling the Local Authority current social housing stock of 
1.2M units) and provide them rent, council tax, and utility free for 30 years. The cost of this 
option takes a £238Bn investment (£189K/unit) and amortises it over 30 years funded by a 30 
year bond at the current UK 30 Year Treasury yield rate of 1.8% resulting in £12.3Bn per year.
Including Council Tax relief for Shelter UBS tenants and existing social housing tenants is a 
way of approximating the cost of compensating local government revenues for the provision of 
this UBS, so we have added a charge per unit in forgone local tax revenues, based on current 
Council Tax Support .
To cover utilities (power, heat, water) we have allocated an allowance of £1,250/year to all 
social tenants, including existing tenants.
To understand the value such a service would have to users we use the current costs for social 
housing and concessionary council tax charges, and assume that 100% of the new housing 
would be split between households in the bottom 2 income deciles.
Distribution of housing will require allocation that will have to be based on assessed needs. For 
the purposes of this summary analysis we have assumed that 55% of the new housing units 
would be allocated to new social tenants in the lowest income decile, and the remaining 45% 
of units to new tenants in the second lowest income decile. This above allocation would meet 
30% and 25% of total housing needs in deciles 1 and 2 respectively.
1 https://www.jrf.org.uk/press/work-poverty-hits-record-high-housing-crisis-fuels-insecurity
2 https://www.local.gov.uk/about/news/rental-logjam-one-seven-private-renters-spend-half-their-income-rent-lga-analysis
3 http://www.webbmemorialtrust.org.uk/home-page/housing-poverty-and-the-good-society-what-can-we-achieve-by-2025/
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1.1  Cost of providing Shelter services 
In this project it is assumed that "Shelter services" comprise the following components: 
 (a) rent free accommodation; 
 (b) no Council Tax obligation for social tenants;
 (c) utilities allowance included free of charge.
Analysis of cost of construction of new housing units. 
Based on a typical cost per unit of £189,000 the total capital cost of this building program would 
be £283.5 Bn. 
It is assumed that this capital cost would be financed using 30 year Treasuries at current 
market rates of 1.80%. This yields an annual cost of £12.31Bn once all the units have been 
built.
In practice it would likely take 7 years to complete the building program costs would ramp up 
starting at £1.2 Bn per year, assuming 1/7th was build in the first year. 
Analysis of cost of Council Tax exemptions
In order not to erode local government revenues while still providing relief for social tenants 
as part of the Shelter UBS we have calculated compensation to local government to replace 
Council Tax revenues.
About 63% of existing social renter households in the lowest two deciles receive some form 
of Council Tax Support (CTS) from local authorities, and taking account of current average 
council tax payments for Band D properties and the mix of existing social tenancies across 
Council Tax Bands yields an average Council Tax bill of £1,181. 
For households receiving CTS the most common method is a minimum payment, which 
averages 16.7% for 2017/18 of the tax across all Local Authorities4. That represents a charge 
of £197 that would normally be levied on the 63% of households  on D1 and D2 that qualify for 
CTS.
4 http://www.counciltaxsupport.org/schemes/
Average CT charge and Social tenancies
Band Charge % Social tenants
A £1,061 58.21%
B £1,237 23.48%
C £1,414 12.59%
D £1,591 4.73%
E £1,945 0.89%
F £2,298 0.09%
We calculate an average local government rebate of £563 per unit per year, based on extending 
the existing portion (63%) of social tenants receiving CTS to include all new social tenancies 
and covering the 37% of existing tenancies’ full CT liability.
Applied across the entire social housing stock of existing and new builds results in an annual 
cost of £1.52Bn once the building program is completed.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX II
44
Utilities Allowances
For utilities we include an annual allowance of £1,250 per unit, based on the 2014 Living Costs 
and Food Survey average utility bill payments (electricity + gas + water) for social renting 
households of £1,211 per household, uprated for inflation.
We apply the same rebate and allowance to the existing 1.2M social housing units, as well as 
the new builds.
Total costs of the Council Tax and utilities allowances will be £4.9Bn per year to central 
government once the building program is completed.
Analysis of effect on existing Housing Benefit costs.
Based on recent Family Resources Survey data (for 2014/15), around 70% of tenant households 
in the bottom 2 deciles receive Housing Benefit and the average HB payment is £76.50/week, 
or £3,980 per year. Applying this to the 1.5M new social housing units yields a saving of 70% x 
1.5M x £3,980 resulting in savings of £4.2Bn from the existing Housing Benefit program once 
the building program is completed.
The overall aggregate cost of providing Shelter services free at 
point-of-use, using these methods, is estimated at: 
 • £13.03 Bn per year
1.2 Cost of providing Food services
We examined 3 options for the Food service, and chose Option 2 to model.
Option 1: Food bank replacement
The Trussell Trust operates 1,373 food banks which handed out 1,182,954 parcels of food, 
each with 3 days supply of food, in the 12 months from April 2016 to April 2017. This equates 
to 10.65M meals at 9 meals per package.
The Independent Food Aid Network estimates that there are an addition 621 food banks 
operating in the UK (excluding informal outlets), which suggests that there is an additional 50% 
of demand over and above the Trussell Trust numbers. Using the JRF MIS budgets averaged 
across and weighted for household types suggests a budget of £1.87 per meal per person.
Combining these numbers, and adding a 15% overhead cost, suggests that a total budget of 
£34.3M would replace food bank use, supplying 15.7M meals a year.
Even if we guesstimate the effect of “open access” in which a referral would not be needed for 
food bank access, and assume that demand would be twice the current recorded demand, the 
total cost would $68.7M.
Neither the costs nor the effects are significant from a macro economic perspective, and while 
we believe that delivering this service would be socially preferable to reliance on charities, it 
does not satisfy the qualifications for a UBS. While this option may satisfy the definition of a 
UBS if access is open, it does meet the safety requirement that a UBS aims to achieve in order 
to liberate citizens from fear and enable a flexible labour market.
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Option 2: Removing “food insecurity” as identified by FSA survey 2016
The Food Standards Authority conducts a nationwide survey every 2 years that includes 
questions which capture the extent of “food insecurity”, defined as having been concerned 
about not having food for the household at some point in the previous 12 months.
The FSA survey results5 suggest that 8% of households experience food insecurity at some 
point in a year. This equates to 2.2M households, a similar number to our estimate for open 
foodbank access.
To bring the scope of this service option up to the level we would expect from a UBS we have 
used a 100% take-up rate in the food insecure population and a provision rate of one third of 
meals.
This service would provide 1,873.9M meals a year, costing £4Bn a year, using the same per 
person per meal costs as above and a 15% overhead.
Option 3: A full community food program
A more fully fledged Food UBS would aim to provide a community service with completely 
open access for all, meeting needs as diverse as an informal UBS survey from 2013 suggests 
of 48% participation for 7 meals a week averaged across the population. This option embodies 
the kind of social institutional fabric that would support and develop a truly cohesive society in 
which UBS provide shared experiences and communal environments. We might be some way 
from being able to even visualise such a service, but it is instructive to understand what such 
a program would look like, and its cost and distributional effects.
A community food program would necessarily be locally designed and delivered, and would 
include many varieties of food service in every locality, from public canteens to food boxes 
for in-home preparation. Different options would cater for different dietary preferences (e.g. 
vegetarian) and different modalities (e.g. take away or eat in). Some communities might 
offer more options and others less, all of which would be decided by, and managed by, an 
accountable local democracy (see Local Democracy section below). 
This option would have a total cost of around £21.2Bn, with values to households ranging from 
£45/week in the lowest deciles to £1.63/week in the highest deciles. Our cursory distributional 
analysis assumes lower take up rates in higher deciles, with 5% of those in the highest decile 
only using the service for 0.5 meals/week, while those in the lowest deciles would use 14 
meals/week.
In practice this kind of UBS is predicated in the existence of much more devolved government 
than we have today, and would need to emerge voluntarily from communities that saw value in 
its provision. As such it is an aspirational model rather than an option which we can reasonably 
propose at this time.
The overall aggregate cost of providing Food services free at 
point-of-use, using Option 2, is estimated at: 
 • £4.03 Bn per year
5 https://www.food.gov.uk/science/research-reports/ssresearch/foodandyou
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6 FT3232 (S428): trends in mean rent after housing benefit
Part 2: Distributional impact of providing Shelter & Food UBS
As the service levels selected for this modelling apply only to the basic needs of the least 
advantaged, we have assumed that all Shelter and Food UBS users would be in the bottom 2 
deciles of the income scale (the households with the lowest equivalised net incomes in decile 
1, and then decile 2, and so on... up to the richest households in decile 10).
For Shelter we have assumed that 55% of the new housing units would go to households in the 
bottom decile and the remaining 45% to households in the second lowest decile.
For Food we have assumed that 100% of the makeup would be from households in the lowest 
income decile.
The distributional impact varies significantly between actual users of the services, and average 
constituents of the deciles including the population who do not use the services. For this reason 
we have evaluated both the User Value and the Average Value across a decile for each service.
2.1 Shelter services
Figure 1 below shows the User Value (blue) of the cash equivalent of free Shelter services, 
classified by household income decile.This is the same in both deciles: £52/week, calculated 
using current average current social rents6 scaled up for inflation, plus £34.87/week in utilities 
and tax savings. The cash-equivalent Average Value (green) of Shelter services across 
deciles 1 and 2, with the differences reflecting the different take-up rates within the populations 
according to decile. 55% of the new housing units in our model are assigned to households in 
D1 and the remaining 45% to households in D2.
The same budget distributed as a Basic Income would provide a per person weekly in-
come, before taxes and any adjustments to benefits, of:
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2.2 Food services
Assuming that the 8% of the population that are food insecure exist exclusively in the poorest 
10% of the total population, we have assumed an 80% take-up rate in decile 1 for the food 
service.
For all users of the service we assume 7 meals a week, constituting 33% of meals.
2.3 Average Value of Shelter, Food, Transport & Information services
This chart combines the results from this and the first Technical Analysis to show the average 
values to households of each of the UBS in each decile.
The same budget distributed as a Basic Income would provide a per person weekly in-
come, before taxes and any adjustments to benefits, of:
Single User 
Household Value
D1 Average HH 
Value
Food Service - Option 2 £12.96 £24.88
Per person/week
Gross UBI 
equivalent
£1.19
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2.4 User Value of Shelter, Food, Transport & Information services
This chart combines the values of each of the UBS to the individuals that actually use the 
services in each decile.
This analysis is limited by the inability to differentiate between different household sizes and 
still deliver a single dataset, however it does demonstrate the increased value of the services to 
service users, showing the target alignment that UBS achieves between needs and resources. 
The big difference being the value to people who use the Shelter and Food services, worth 
over £100/week. The Information service assumes almost uniform use across the deciles, and 
users in any decile who use public transport benefit equally.
The reason UBI value is less than UBS value is because the UBS have greater displacement 
value to the recipients than the cost of their provision.
We also note, with reference to the UBI modelled later in this document, that the cost of all the 
UBS have a net budget cost equal to a taxed UBI of £20/week gross, which yields a average 
net value of only £4.15/week to the lowest 2 deciles.
The same budget distributed as a Basic Income would provide a per person weekly 
income, before taxes and any adjustments to benefits, of:
The same budget distributed as a Basic Income would provide a per person weekly 
income, before taxes and any adjustments to benefits, of:
Per person/week
Gross UBI 
equivalent
£12.47
Per person/week
Gross UBI 
equivalent
£12.47
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Part 3: Distributional analysis of revenue-neutral packages 
for UBS financed by reductions in the Personal Income Tax 
Allowance
3.1 Financing services using reductions in the Personal Allowance
This charts shows the distributional impact of Basic Services financed by reducing the value of 
the personal allowance for income tax by £7,200, from its 2017-18 value of £11,500 to £4,300. 
This raises around £45bn, almost precisely offsetting the cost of providing the UBS services 
free at point-of-use.
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Cash Values
This shows average gains overall for the bottom 3 deciles and losses for the top 6 deciles. 
Losers pay an average of £18.12 a week.
Percentage Impact 
The lowest income decile gains by 30%, deciles 1 to 3 gain an average of 13%, and deciles 4 
through 10 lose 2% on average.
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Part 4: A Basic Income Supplement
Universal Basic Services (UBS) and Universal Basic Income (UBI) could be complimentary 
components of a sustainable future for social welfare. Progressive proponents of a UBI 
assume the pre-existence of a platform of social welfare services, and advocates of UBS 
acknowledge that there are both personal and specific needs that will require some form of 
monetary distribution to preserve freedom and agency.
We note that there are various mechanisms by which this income could be distributed, including 
a revolving credit account, however those different methods of distribution do not affect the 
macro economic analysis if the assumption is that all of the credit provided is always spent.
4.1 Sizing a Basic Services income supplement
To satisfy this requirement for some form of basic income supplement we have examined the 
costs and effects of adding a £20/week per person supplement.
In our model we applied this payment to every individual irrespective of age.
We have modelled 2 versions of the treatment of this income: 
 1. Taxed: in this model the £20/week (£1,040/year) is added to taxable incomes.
 2. Untaxed: in this model the supplement is treated as tax-free income for all. 
In both cases we have made the following adjustments to existing benefits :
 A. Replaced Child Benefit
 B. Reduced Job Seekers Allowance by the same amount
 C. Reduced State Pension by the same amount
 D. Reduced Disability benefits by the same amount
4.2 £20/week income supplement as taxable income
A £20/week taxable income supplement including the adjustments to benefits described above 
would have a net cost £44.5Bn a year, and the chart below shows the distributional impact of 
that (in addition to the UBS) funded by eliminating the Personal Income Tax Allowance.
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4.1 Sizing a Basic Services income supplement
The small difference is unsurprising as the Personal Allowance has some equivalence to 
a universal payment, and the reduction in the allowance needed to make the CI payment 
revenue neutral means that the distributional effect is also pretty flat.
The net difference between UBS on is own and the addition of a small £20 UBI supplement 
(treated as taxed income and reducing means tested benefits) is very slightly more progressive, 
providing an additional £3 to £5 a week in the lowest 3 deciles, and £5/week in the 10th decile 
because many of those households have had their PA withdrawn through the existing tax 
system at higher incomes.
4.3 £20/week income supplement as tax free income
A tax-free basic income payment of £20/week costs £10Bn even after eliminating the Personal 
Allowance.
We have not included the modelling on this option as it would require increases in tax rates to 
make it revenue neutral, and such an analysis is beyond the scope of this document.
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Part 5: Local Governance Costs
As implementation of Universal Basic Services (UBS) will require more accountable and 
effective local government, we have made some estimates of the costs that this additional 
local governing architecture.
Assumptions
Using these basic assumptions we have built a model for estimating costs:
 • 650 local governments
 • 25 elected members in each constituency 
 • twice as many administrators as members
 • elected members paid 5X the local average income (£100,000 average)
 • administration staff paid national average (£21,300)
 • £1M annual capital grant for elections, buildings and infrastructure costs
These assumptions result in an annual cost of £2.97Bn once all localities 
have their governance up and running.
Process
It is likely that adoption of the local governance model, which would be voluntary but necessary 
to gain direct control of local funds dedicated to UBS, would start more slowly and then ramp 
up.
Although the replacement of local councillors is probable in many areas we have not factored 
any such reductions or savings into our model.
The same budget distributed as a Basic Income would provide a per person weekly 
income, before taxes and any adjustments to benefits, of:
Per person/week
Gross UBI equivalent £0.88
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Part 6: Effect of UBS on UK Budget
To provide an overview of the effect of the proposal for Universal Basic Services (UBS) on the 
overall UK spending an revenue budgets we analysed current spending on UBS-type services, 
and then added the proposed additional spending and revenues.
6.1  Current UK spending (2017) on UBS-type services
Total spending is just under 41% of GDP and UBS-type services (Health, Education, Housing, 
Transport, excluding Legal) represents 41% of total spending.
Total 2017 revenues are 38% of GDP, and revenues from income related taxes + other taxes 
represent 41% of total revenues.
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6.2  UK spending with proposed UBS expanded services
Spending would increase to 43.1% of GDP and UBS services excluding Legal (Public Order, 
General government and democracy services) would account for 46.7% of total spending.
Additional UBS spending is highlighted in yellow.
Total revenues would increase to 40% of GDP as a result of reducing the PA to £4,300, with 
income-related taxes + other accounting for 44.2% of total revenues.
An opportunity to link UBS spending and income-related revenues is noteworthy.
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